Analisis Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance Terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan dengan Firm Size Sebagai Variabel Kontrol pada Perusahaan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Saham Malaysia

Meylin, Meylin (2012) Analisis Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance Terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan dengan Firm Size Sebagai Variabel Kontrol pada Perusahaan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Saham Malaysia. Undergraduate thesis, Universitas Internasional Batam.

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Abstract

The early perspective corporate governance came from agency theory. The conflict of interest between principal and agent could be happen because existence of dissociation between ownership and management of company. The corporate governance appears to minimize that conflict and to control their behavior. This research aim on analyzing the effect of some internal and external corporate governance mechanism on firm performance. The dependent variable firm’s performance is measured using Tobin’s q, while the independent variables are institutional investor, governmental ownership, board size, debt ratio, dividend payout ratio and audit type with firm size as control variable. The research population is the Government-Linked Companies (GLC) listed in Bursa Malaysia, in period from 2004 to 2010. Using the purposive sampling method, samples that meet the requirements are 30 firms or 210 observations data. This research uses multiple regression method to analyze the effect of independent variables on dependent variable. The data are then analyzed using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) 17.0. The research result shows that board size, debt ratio, dividend payout ratio, audit type and firm size have a significant effect on firm’s performance. The result also indicates that institutional investor and governmental ownership have no significant effect on firm’s performance. These finding shows that leverage, distribution of dividend and the external auditor can be used as governance mechanism to reduce the agency problem. In spite of that, firm must also seek for an optimal number of board size which is best suited with the size of the firm in order to maximize the performance. Keywords: Agency Theory, Corporate Governance, Tobin’s Q, Institutional Investor, Governmental Ownership, Board Size, Debt Ratio, Dividend Payout Ratio, Audit Type, and Firm Size.

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